This is the second in a series of brief statistical reports elaborating some of the details and difficulties of daily life for Palestinian families during the April 2002 Israeli invasion of the West Bank. The first report pertained to conditions in Ramallah/al-Bireh. Here, we will focus on the city of Nablus; reports written by journalists, researchers and institutions pertaining to what happened during the period of the Israeli invasion complement the findings of this house-to-house survey. The statistical reports that will follow include the towns of Jenin, Tulkarm and Bethlehem. A final report will sum up the individual town reports and will provide summary results for all the towns combined.
As with Ramallah/Bireh, this is a house-to-house survey which identifies the household as its main unit of analysis, offering quantitative indicators that are generalizable to all of the households and population of the city, estimated by the Palestinian Central Bureau of Statistics (PCBS) to be 18,003 households and a population of 100,231 in 1997. The invasion of Nablus began on 4 April 2002 and ended on the 22nd. However, periodic re-invasions of the towns have continued up until the time of writing this report, where the Israeli army comes in, destroys homes and infrastructure, arrests or kills selected individuals then leaves. It should also be pointed out here that the World Bank has recently estimated the damage incurred during the invasion of the West Bank at 361 million US dollars, with the Nablus area having been identified as the hardest hit, and with repair costs there estimated at 114 million US dollars.
This house-to-house survey was conducted during the first 10 days of May 2002, just after the lifting of the curfew and the partial withdrawal of the Israeli army to the outskirts of town. A stratified random sample of households was chosen, primarily based on locale and representative of all of the households in the city.
A sample of 154 households was selected utilizing stratified cluster sampling techniques. The city was divided into 5 strata, whereby 2-3 random starting points were selected. From each starting point a systematic sample of every 10th household was selected. In this survey, the expected maximum margin of error at city level is:
E= 1.96*DE*sqrt((P)*(Q)/(n)).
P= The percentage of a certain attribute.
Q=1-P.
DE=Design Effect due to clustering.
The estimated value of DE=1.1.
E= 1.96*sqrt((0.5)(0.5)(1.1)/(150))=8.8 per cent.
Data entry was completed using the Access database. Proper control structure was defined on closed questions. Data was transferred to SPSS using "StatTransfer" software. Double entry was conducted for a sample of the questionnaire to check for errors that could not be detected by the control structure defined in Access. One out of 50 questionnaires experienced swapping values like 1 entered instead of 2 or visa versa.
One hundred and fifty-four household heads or adult members were interviewed. The mean age of respondents was 42 years. Fifty-one per cent were women and the rest men. Fifteen per cent were illiterate, 27 per cent with elementary schooling, 18 per cent with preparatory, 25 per cent with secondary, 8 per cent with higher diplomas, 6 per cent with Bachelor's degree (considerably less than the 20 per cent found in Ramallah/Bireh) and 2 per cent with Master's degree or more. While caution should be made when comparing with PCBS figures as those pertain to a population aged 10 years or over, the PCBS reports a 6 per cent rate of illiteracy for Nablus in 1997, 15 per cent as being able to read and write, 63 per cent with secondary schooling or below, 6 per cent with post-high-school education, 9 per cent with Bachelor's degrees and 9 per cent with more than Bachelor's.
The average household size was 6.22 persons per household, lower than the 6.8 found for Ramallah, but higher than the 5.4 reported by the PCBS for Nablus in 1977, again perhaps indicating a shift in household composition as a result of the invasion. The smallest household in this survey was composed of three persons and the largest 21. Of the total, 15 per cent only were composed of extended families (with three or more generations living together), again lower than the 28 per cent found for Ramallah and also lower than what has been reported for Nablus by the PCBS in 1977, at 23 per cent.
Examining the data in relation to shifting household composition during the invasion, with families housing other families during the curfew and siege in protection against danger, and as families moved out of dangerous areas into perceived less dangerous ones, we find results similar to those found for Ramallah/Bireh. Here, 29 per cent of the respondents reported housing other families and/or friends during the invasion, almost the same rate (30 per cent) as in Ramallah/Bireh. Of those reporting housing people other than household members, two-thirds (as in Ramallah/Bireh) reported that they were members of their extended family, one-tenth housed neighbours (probably because the army took over their homes), one-tenth housed friends (as opposed to a high quarter in Ramallah/Bireh), and the rest a mix, even members of the national security forces or strangers who do not live in the town and who were stranded.
When asked why guests sought shelter in their homes, about half reported guests moved in because of shelling, the presence of the army close by and fear for their lives as their areas were deemed too dangerous; about one-tenth thought that being with family gives the feeling of safety; another one-tenth reported the presence of a pregnant woman at home due to deliver soon and thought it better to move out of their area, presumably because health services are easier to reach where they moved to; another tenth moved out of their homes because the Israeli army took over their home, occupied it and used it for its own purposes, and the rest a mix of reasons such as having been used as a human shield and ending up somewhere else other than home, living in a place outside and inside Nablus and stranded there during the invasion, and home destroyed by shelling.
The results from Nablus seem to be comparable to those of Ramallah/Bireh, perhaps indicating a pattern of generalized response to emergency combined with similar conditions that led people to act in similar ways. Again, these results are important in that they demonstrate this temporary shift in household composition and internal migration in search of some safety as an important feature of conditions during the period and also as an important method of coping with war. Strong family and communal ties become more important than usual during exceptional circumstances, and prompt active cooperation of families, neighbours and friends with each other.
Of the female respondents, 76 per cent were housewives, and the rest - 14 per cent - working women: this is almost exactly the same level of women in paid work as in Ramallah/Bireh and is almost identical to the 14.5 per cent reported by the PCBS in 1997. Women are mostly employed in white-collar occupations.
Of the men, 15 per cent were employers or owner-operators in the private sector, owning a shop or running a private business, a low of 5 per cent were professionals (teachers, nurses, doctors, lawyers), 24 per cent were white-collar workers - less than the 32 per cent for Ramallah/Bireh - and a high of 38 per cent were semi-skilled or unskilled workers. Fourteen per cent reported themselves as having been unemployed prior to the invasion, compared to the 7 per cent rate of unemployment reported by the PCBS for 1997 for those aged 10 or above, but close to the 12 per cent reported for Ramallah/Bireh in our survey. The rest were students. Of those reporting that they were working prior to the invasion, 27 per cent reported job loss since that time. Of those, more than three-quarters explained this new unemployment in terms of the collapse of the economy and the market since the invasion, and the rest blamed the closures and siege. These results are very similar to those obtained for Ramallah/Bireh and point to, perhaps, a generalized as opposed to locale-specific increase in poverty levels, even beyond what was estimated by the PCBS for the first six months of the intifadah.
Nablus suffered serious power cuts during the invasion and curfew that had a negative impact not only on family life, but on commercial enterprises as well, with reports of substantial loss of food items that required refrigeration. In this survey, a high of 47 per cent of respondents reported living without electricity for most or all of the period of the invasion, a rate that is higher than for Ramallah/Bireh (20 per cent), and confirming in part the observation that Nablus was perhaps the hardest hit of all the towns. Being without electricity certainly complicates family life to a considerable extent, especially where there are children and additional guests as well. About 45 per cent reported loss of electricity for some of the time, and 8 per cent reported no power shortages at. Just to note, power interruptions also affected an estimated population of 14,000 people in nearby villages, as the Nablus Electric Company serves not only the city, but also selected nearby locales.
Thirty-nine per cent of households reported tap water shortages most or all of the time, a rate similar to that of Ramallah, again due to shelling, bombing, shooting and vandalism affecting the different levels of the water system. Thirty-nine per cent reported water shortages for part of the time, and 22 per cent no water shortages at all. During such times people usually rely on water wells. Of the total who have telephones, 44 per cent had their telephone lines cut all of the time, 7 per cent most of the time, 15 per cent some of the time and the rest did not face problems with phones.
The majority of households, on the other hand (84 per cent) reported no problems with sewage disposal, with the rest mostly reporting blown up sewage pipes and cesspools not being emptied. As in Ramallah, the waste problem was big, affecting 98 per cent of families who said that they had serious problems getting rid of their rubbish, mostly reporting the problem of unemptied waste containers as municipal services came to a halt during the period. Several families reported not being able to get the rubbish out of the house, with waste piling up inside their home. On the whole, given that the areas that were mostly affected by the violence were hardest hit in terms of loss of electricity, water and telephones combined, family lives must have been very difficult indeed, especially among families with young children and elderly and disabled members.
Of the total respondents, 37 per cent reported food availability problems during the invasion and curfew period, and 43 per cent reported food unavailability in the market once the curfew was being lifted periodically for people to shop for essentials. Of the total, 33 per cent also reported a problem of cash availability, less than the reports from Ramallah (54 per cent), perhaps because either Nablus is a strong commercial centre or because it has more extended family support networks than Ramallah, where the first impressions that one gets of Ramallah might lead one to think that household cash is more abundant there, given Ramallah's function as an administrative and governmental centre.
In Nablus, the pattern was similar to Ramallah, with an initial period where the curfew was not being lifted at all and families could not get out to buy food, followed by a period where the curfew was lifted but selected fresh food items were not available, followed by an easing up of the problem of food availability and the uncovering of the problem of cash availability. The difference here is that, throughout the invasion, banks did not reopen, even for the minimal services offered in Ramallah.
When asked about how families coped when faced with low food supply, 7 per cent said they began to bake their own bread at home (in contrast to a higher 18 per cent in Ramallah), a high of 38 per cent said they relied on family and friends, a significantly higher rate than in Ramallah (5 per cent), 20 per cent reported substituting one type of food with another, and the rest gave mixed answers, with austerity measures of eating less frequently reported rather less than in Ramallah, and raising questions as to why this was one important method of coping in Ramallah, when in Nablus it appears not to have been so. Again, the higher rate of family reliance may be an answer. However, and unlike Ramallah, a surprisingly high rate (about 20 per cent) reported substituting milk for children with tea, not only losing an important source of protein and calcium, but contributing to the problem of loss of food iron from the body as tea chelates iron and blocks its absorption. These results raise the question of the need to conduct a specific nutritional status of children survey that includes clinical exams focusing on anaemia in childhood during exceptional circumstances.
As for cash availability problems, Nablus residents managed in slightly different ways than in Ramallah: 36 per cent reported spending less in contrast to a higher 50 per cent in Ramallah, (yet eating less was hardly reported in Nablus, perhaps because the people of Nablus store larger quantities of food at home), 30 per cent borrowed money from family and friends, 28 per cent relied on food shops loaning them food on account (as in Ramallah), 8 per cent delved into savings intended for use for purposes other than eating and 7 per cent resorted to living with what was at home (more than 100 per cent as multiple reports were allowed). Overall, while families emerged out of the crisis, difficulties are not over yet, with the continuation of the siege, the collapse of the market and unemployment forming serious family life problems in this community.
When asked about shooting, explosions and destruction in their areas, a high of 57 per cent reported that they endured much of that during the period, almost continuously (Ramallah: a lower 29 per cent), 29 per cent a lot of the time and 13 per cent only a little, again confirming the observation that Nablus was harder hit than Ramallah. Again, the results seem to be related to the area where households are located, with locations in and near the old city suffering more damage, such as Ras al-Ein and Krum Ashour, as well as al-Quds and Nablus street in the nearby vicinity. That is, the main assault seems to have been on the Old City and its surrounding areas, as this survey seems to indicate.
In response to how households managed, 57 per cent reported hiding in fear, lack of sleep and mental distress; 14 per cent reported the family hiding in one room, speaking quietly so as not to draw the army's attention to their presence, 9 per cent reported having to pay attention to children who were in great fear, again crying and urinating uncontrollably on themselves; and the rest responded in a variety of ways, including depression, learning the lessons and withstanding in resistance, waiting till the army came inside the house, or even behaving normally, at 5 per cent, as fear had become normal or a way of life.
Again, consistent with the above findings, a high of 67 per cent (Ramallah: 52 per cent) reported considerable destruction in their neighbourhoods. Of those, a high of 44 per cent (Ramallah: 39 per cent) reported pervasive destruction of retaining walls, telephones, electricity poles, shops, pavements, cars and even traffic signs; 22 per cent - as in Ramallah - reported the destruction of homes, doors, the breaking of furniture and windows as well as water pipes, while 13 per cent reported the destruction of nearby homes as well, which, combined (35 per cent), point to a higher level of home destruction than in Ramallah; and with scattered answers such as: "I cannot describe what I saw", or "bullets shot into the house".
Of the total, 34 per cent reported that their home was directly exposed to shooting, bombing and destruction, compared to 28 per cent in Ramallah. More than half reported that the shooting was directed at their home's walls, glass, entrances and retaining walls; a quarter (Ramallah: one-fifth) reported that the army occupied their homes, destroyed and broke windows, cupboards, furniture, threw food out of cupboards and all over the place and dirtied their homes, again pointing to the higher severity of incidents in Nablus; 2 per cent reported theft by the Israeli army; and the rest reported destruction of water and sewage pipes.
Of the total households, 50 per cent reported that their homes were searched by the Israeli army (41 per cent for Ramallah). Respondents also reported the arrest of at least one of their family members in 24 per cent of the cases, probably during home searches, but not solely. These are likely to have been temporary arrests, of course, but certainly add to the weight of fear and terror in the family. Among those with searched homes, over half reported that the Israeli army broke the belongings in their homes in the process, with a high of a fifth reporting theft of belongings, adding weight to the reports on the Israeli army's stealing of people's belongings but casting doubt on the assumption that theft was more prevalent in Ramallah. This impression may be due to the fact that documentation of theft took place earlier and more precisely than in other towns, rather than Ramallah being an exclusive venue where Israeli soldiers engaged in widespread theft. These results indicate once again the appearance of a picture of systematic theft, and not only destruction and vandalism.
Asked about the workplace of household members who were working prior to the invasion, 12 per cent reported direct damage there, very low in contrast to the high of 41 per cent in Ramallah, perhaps because of the higher level of indiscriminate violence against homes that took place in Nablus and the assault on institutions, particularly ministries, in Ramallah. Again, cars were directly affected by the violence in 9 per cent of the cases in Nablus, compared to a high 19 per cent for Ramallah. On the whole, though, these results demonstrate that a consistent pattern of vandalism is beginning to appear that may be reinforced or negated once we analyse the results from the other towns. However, as they stand now, the results at hand cannot be justified by claims of "incidental occurrences" of such awful destruction nor "security" considerations. Instead, what appears to be the case is deliberate and systematic destruction, violence and the creation of fear in a very large number of the population.
A lower than expected 22 per cent of households (Ramallah: 49 per cent) reported a medication availability problem during the period. It is not clear why there is such a large discrepancy between households in these two communities, but this may be due to differing household routines and ways of life, with Ramallah residents being more "urbane" and less inclined to storage of things at home, and even perhaps more inclined to be dependent on medications as a way of life. In addition, Nablus residents may have learnt from the experience of the earlier Ramallah invasion and stocked up with the necessary medicines.
Of those experiencing this problem, almost half (a quarter for Ramallah) just waited until the siege was over, one quarter got help from neighbours and friends (probably acquiring substitute medications), one-tenth called the Red Crescent, one-twentieth called the UPMRC and the rest used indigenous medical practices or managed to reach hospital. Negative ramifications or complications because of the absence of medicines was reported by almost half of those who reported problems with medication availability, with one-sixteenth specifically reporting out of control diabetes mellitus increasing in this way the risk of future complication with the heart, kidney and eye, among other organs. Again, the long-term effects of the sudden interruption in the availability of necessary medicines, especially in the case of difficult-to-control chronic diseases, such as hypertension and diabetes, can only be speculative, yet the reports do indicate the need for a study of the consequences of the lack of medications and, perhaps more importantly, the lack of primary and secondary care among selected groups within the population as an important priority research in the near future.
Again in contrast to Ramallah, with the rate of mental health problems reported in households as high as 93 per cent, a lower 70 per cent of responded stated that they faced a variety of problems with various members of their family. Given the higher severity of the onslaught in Nablus compared to Ramallah, perhaps these results are indicative of the "awareness" of the symptoms of the problem, or perhaps a willingness of respondents to speak about mental health problems without worrying about "taboo and image", that is, if our assumption of a more "urbane" and exposed Ramallah is correct. Surely, these differences call for further investigation. Of all the respondents here, a high of 53 per cent reported the problem in terms of fear, screaming, crying, inability to eat or sleep and psychological disturbances generally, and 12 per cent focused on these symptoms in children especially. When asked about how they managed these symptoms and coped with these trying times, a high of 22 per cent singled out praying as a method of coping (Ramallah: 6 per cent), followed by a focus on relieving children's fear, sleeping with them and taking care of them at 20 per cent, 17 per cent drew on self-control and ability to withstand, and only 7 per cent reported watching television (probably because the power cuts were more severe and longer), playing cards, etc., and then a range of answers such as "dealt with the situation as normally", drinking indigenous herbs to feel better, seeking the help of a counsellor, sleeping at a neighbour's house and calling friends and family to see if they are all right.
The last question asked to respondents pertained to their views on the current conditions. Again, a high of 74 per cent reported views expressing despair and misery over what was happening to their lives (Ramallah: 71 per cent), an additional 30 per cent showed great concern over the family's financial situation, with the rest offering a range of answers such as "Excellent because we deserve what happened to us", and "These are abnormal times, they will come again", "God the Almighty will make the conditions better", "What Israel and America want will happen", "This calls for our insistence on popular resistance" and "This indicates a crisis in politics, a lack of clear vision and strategy, and lack of unity". These answers combined, and collated with the Ramallah results, allow for a picture to emerge focusing on the issue of despair as key to understanding the current state of the population of Palestine, and perhaps not only the towns that were studied. Despair, combined with cumulative international and overall neglect, want and deprivation can have a marked influence on current behaviour and future aspirations as well.
In addition to quantifying the phenomena reported by others through qualitative methods and interviews, this study demonstrates both similarities and differences in the experiences of ordinary people living in Nablus and Ramallah during the Israeli invasion of their areas. On the one hand, household reports indicate a uniformity of experiences that cannot be explained by accidental destruction in the pursuit of "security". On the other hand, responses to this terror in Nablus appear to be different from Ramallah in ways that social relations, setting and mode of life seem to dictate, and may be an indication of the cultural differences noted between the two cities. Nablus households report having been harder hit than Ramallah, confirming earlier reports pertaining to this matter. But the pattern of destruction and vandalism is clear: such rampant destruction and events witnessed by ordinary people cannot be simply accepted as accidental or haphazard as the Israeli army claims. This study demonstrates otherwise, given the consistency in reporting specific events, such as the destruction of homes and property, breaking household belongings, ruining food supplies, stealing people's valuables, to name but a few clear indicators of a deliberate policy or an out-of-control army, or both.
To estimate the number of households and people that were affected by specific serious difficulties in dealing with daily life as a consequence of the Israeli invasion, we are using the PCBS's census report of Nablus's population of 100,231 and 18,003 Households:
The following calculations may be useful:
1. Family composition change during exceptional circumstances
2. Unavailability of basic services
3. Shortage of food and cash
4. Shootings, explosion and destruction of property and institutions
5. Medications
6. Mental health
1. Greenberg, Joel, "West Bank damages put at $361 million, New York Times, 26 May 2002.
2. Palestinian Central Bureau of Statistics, Population, housing and establishment Census, 1997. City Reports Series. Final Results Nablus City, 2000.
3. Palestinian Central Bureau of Statistic, Population of Palestinian Communities, 1997-2010 (Ramallah-Palestine, 1999).
*Institute of Community and Public Health, Birzeit University